时间：2012年6月6日（周三）中午12:30-14:00
地点：太阳集团tcy8722203
主讲人：孟涓涓（太阳集团娱乐官方网站光华管理学院应用经济系讲师）
题目：The Crowding-out Effect of Formal Insurance on Informal Risk Sharing Arrangements:An Experimental Study
主讲人介绍：
太阳集团娱乐官方网站光华管理学院应用经济系讲师，加州大学圣地亚哥分校经济学博士（2010），主要研究领域为劳动经济学。最近在《美国经济评论》发表论文（with Vincent P. Crawford, “New York City Cabdrivers` Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Utility with Targets for Hours and Income, AER 101 (August 2011): 1912-1932 ），且为以下国际期刊匿名审稿人：The American Economic Review, The Journal of Political Economics, Journal of European Economic Association, Theoretical Economics, International Tax and Public Finance。
内容提要：
An important issue with promoting formal insurance in the rural areas of developing countries that has been previously ignored is the interaction between formal insurance and preexisting informal risk sharing arrangements. This paper shows in theory that formal insurance will crowd out informal transfers even when individuals do not purchase insurance, which often makes the overall welfare impact of formal insurance negative. Our laboratory experiment indeeddocuments significant crowding-out effect. However, the overall welfare is improved when ex-ante income is equal but not when income inequality exists. The decision not to purchase formal insurance, the existence of ex-ante income inequality and altruistic motive are shown to reinforce the negative welfare impact of formal insurance.
（本文系与Wanchuan Lin, Yiming Liu合作）
论文请见附件
点击下载：Crowding-out_2012_0306.pdf
